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In recent years, there is a growing interest among researches on how narcissistic CEOs 
impact the firms that they lead. Research has suggested that narcissistic leaders with 
characteristics of dominant, self-confident, grandiosity, and low empathy can both positively 
and negatively influence organizations. Interestingly, CEO personality relates to executive 
compensation as well. Further, previous psychology research suggested that firms with 
relatively higher compensated CEOs are more likely to make positive outcomes in the firm. 
Therefore, this research aims to examine the compensation mediation effect on the 
relationship between narcissism and firm performance for the 441 public listed companies 
in Malaysia. Thus, by examining particularly CEO’s narcissism, this research aims to deliver 
new approaches to scholars and regulators about the significance of CEO’s narcissism on 
firm performance. For the theoretical frameworks, Upper Echelons Theory and Agency 
Theory have been used in this research to measure the impacts of CEO narcissism and 
compensation towards firm performance. This research uses several measurements such as 
prominence of CEO’s photograph in the annual report, CEO’s prominence in the company’s 
press release and CEO’s publicity, CEO’s relative cash pay as proxies of CEO narcissism as 
the independent variable to determine firm performance, whereby firm size, firm age and 
leverage are the control variables and executive compensation acts as the mediator variable 
in this study. Meanwhile, the dependent variable is firm performance which is measured by 
accounting-based and market-based measures of firm performance. Using two approaches: 
TSLS and instrumental panel regression, the results show that executive compensation is 
partially mediating the relationship between CEO narcissism and firm performance. 
 
 
Therefore, this study proposes that narcissism does truly predict firm performance, however 
the relationship between narcissism and firm performance is mediated by an important 
aspect, which is executive compensation. This study also offers pathways on the selection 
of CEO personality trait in the contemporary business environment in Malaysia. In 
conclusion, the importance of CEO narcissism as a significant indicator of executive 
compensation and firm performance is certainly remarkable given its presumed dominance 
as a personality characteristic among the globe’s most influential executives and leaders.  
 





















Dalam tahun-tahun kebelakangan ini, terdapat minat yang semakin meningkat di kalangan 
penyelidik mengenai bagaimana CEO narsisistik memberi kesan terhadap firma yang 
mereka pimpin. Penyelidikan telah mencadangkan bahawa para pemimpin narsisistik 
dengan ciri-ciri yang dominan, percaya diri, kecemerlangan, dan empati yang rendah boleh 
mempengaruhi organisasi secara positif dan negatif. Menariknya, personaliti CEO 
berkaitan dengan kompensasi eksekutif juga. Tambahan lagi, penyelidikan psikologi 
sebelumnya mencadangkan bahawa firma dengan CEO yang lebih tinggi kompensasi lebih 
cenderung untuk menghasilkan hasil positif di firma itu. Oleh itu, kajian ini bertujuan untuk 
mengkaji kesan mediasi kompensasi ke atas hubungan antara narsisisme dan prestasi firma 
bagi 441 syarikat tersenarai awam di Malaysia. Oleh itu, dengan meneliti terutamanya 
narsisisme Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif, penyelidikan ini bertujuan untuk menyampaikan 
pendekatan baru kepada para ulama dan pengawal selia mengenai kepentingan narsisisme 
CEO terhadap prestasi firma. Untuk rangka kerja teoritis, Teori Eselon Atas dan Teori 
Agensi telah digunakan dalam penyelidikan ini untuk mendapatkan kesan narsisisme dan 
pampasan CEO terhadap prestasi firma. Penyelidikan ini menggunakan beberapa ukuran 
seperti keterangan gambar Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif dalam laporan tahunan, Ketua 
Pegawai Eksekutif dalam siaran akhbar syarikat dan publisiti Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif, gaji 
tunai Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif sebagai proksi narsisisme Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif sebagai 
pembolehubah bebas untuk menentukan prestasi firma, di mana saiz firma, umur firma dan 
leverage adalah pemboleh ubah kawalan dan kompensasi eksekutif bertindak sebagai 
 
 
pemboleh ubah dalam kajian ini. Sementara itu, pemboleh ubah bergantung adalah prestasi 
firma yang diukur oleh ukuran prestasi firma berasaskan perakaunan dan berasaskan 
pasaran. Menggunakan dua pendekatan: TSLS dan regresi panel instrumental, hasil 
menunjukkan bahawa kompensasi eksekutif sebahagiannya mengantara hubungan antara 
CEO narsisme dan prestasi firma. Oleh itu, kajian ini mencadangkan bahawa narsisisme 
benar-benar meramalkan prestasi firma, namun hubungan antara narsisisme dan prestasi 
firma ditengahi oleh aspek penting, iaitu kompensasi eksekutif. Kajian ini juga menawarkan 
laluan kepada pemilihan ciri keperibadian CEO dalam persekitaran perniagaan 
kontemporari di Malaysia. Sebagai kesimpulan, kepentingan narsisisme CEO sebagai 
penunjuk penting kompensasi eksekutif dan prestasi firma pastinya luar biasa 
memandangkan dominasinya dianggap sebagai ciri keperibadian di kalangan eksekutif dan 
pemimpin dunia yang paling berpengaruh. 
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The economy turbulence in nowadays world has taught us that performance of a firm might 
change through times. For instance, before deep depression on 1930, the performance of 
firms rose exponentially due to the industrialization. Then, oil boom came on 1970s gave 
good profit for firms in developing countries. Yet, 1980s the banking crisis crushed it again. 
Before 1997s, trading and export-based firms were the new rising tiger due to cheap labor 
and increasing middle class. However, the monetary crisis 1997 swept all the performance 
of those companies.  
 
Interestingly, companies with good CEO survive through those hard times. For example, 
after Steve Jobs rejoined Apple as CEO in 1997 when the company was in dreadful shape, 
he delivered a massive 3,188% industry-adjusted return (34% compounded annually). 
Apple’s fair value increased by $150 billion from that period until the end of September 
2009 (Hansen et al., 2010). 
 
In psychology literature, this can be explained via personality theory. This means that CEO 
with better personality will perform better than CEO with worse personality. According to 
Big Five Model (McCrae & Costa, 1987), personalities may influence one’s job performance 
in an organization. Studies done by Mount et al. (1998) state that emotional stability, 
agreeableness and conscientiousness are positively associated with job performance which 
 
 
needing interpersonal interactions. Emotional stability and agreeableness are more intensely 
related to job performance that requires teamwork than in those that depend more on mutual 
interaction. Besides, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) show that narcissistic CEO can 
influence firm performance variance and strategy-making individually. Some prior studies 
(Tosi et al., 2004; Resick et al., 2009; Kaplan et al., 2010) tend to propose a positive 
relationship between the personality characteristics of CEO and firm performance. 
 
Interestingly, CEO personality relates to the compensation as well. For example, according 
to “Narcissistic CEOs and CEO compensation” by O'Reilly et al. (2014), it is stated that 
CEO's narcissism might have an impact on the forms of CEO compensation. Though 
majority of the study on CEO compensation has presumed an agency theory model (Tosi & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Bebchuk & Fried, 2004) to guarantee that the interests of the executives 
are in line with the shareholders, an extended practice of research has proved that CEOs are 
also able to affect the board to develop policies that benefit the CEO (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 
1989; Wade et al., 1990; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Additionally, CEO’s compensation also 
plays role on firm performance. Belliveau et al. (1996), Brick et al. (2006) and Ozkan (2007) 
discover a strongly positive association between CEO’s compensation and firm performance. 
 
Douglas Mattern (2001) mentions that CEOs of main organizations in US generate 42 times 
of the average workers’ salary in 1980. The amount has increased to 85 times by 1990. In 
2000, the average CEO pay hits an incredible 531 times that of the average workers’ salary. 
In the year of 2010, research has been conducted on S&P 500 US corporations and average 
CEO pay is reported at $11.4 million per year in 2010. The High Pay Commission declares 
that it has a harsh influence over the economy and the public is aware of this matter over the 
 
 
past decades (BBC, 2011). This matter impacts the competencies, performance, and efficacy 
of the workforces in the business world and correspondingly social gap rises due to CEO’s 
pay whether too high or even too low is established on salary, bonuses such as worker benefit, 
short-term incentive, insurance and paid expenditures. 
 
As CEO compensation has turned out to be a contentious public subject recently, Bebchuk 
and Fried (2004) realises that CEO compensation is not closely related to firm performance. 
Moreover, Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) reports that CEO compensation has increased too 
high beyond the boundary that can be explained by the increase in firm size and firm 
performance through their study for the period of 1993-2003. The findings observed by 
Bebchuck and Grinstein (2005) show that while CEO compensation in public corporations 
amounted to as much as 10% of business earnings in 2001-2003, only 20% of the increase 
in CEO compensation can be well-defined by the growing in firm size and firm performance. 
Other people like Brandes et al. (2008) response to the notion of Bebchuck and Grinstein 
(2005), suggesting that prominent investors observe that corporate executives are being 
disproportionately paid. Thus, this matter will make several institutional investors to 
abandon their old-style passive role and aggressively practise their power over CEO 
compensation decisions in the business corporations. 
 
The primary purpose of this research is to deliver empirical evidence in relation to CEO’s 
personality and firm performance. CEO’s personality is perceived as the influential 
mechanism that observes and guides the company in practising their obligation to safeguard 
the shareholders’ interest. Thus, by examining CEO’s personality characteristics particularly 
 
 
narcissism, this research aims to deliver new approaches to scholars and regulators about the 
significance of CEO’s personality on firm performance. Additionally, prior researches 
indicate that CEO’s personality characteristics are able to positively influence the CEO 
compensation. To reconfirm the observation from the previous studies, this research 
investigates the relationship between CEO’s narcissism, CEO compensation and firm 
performance for the 441 public listed companies in Malaysia. 
 
The introduction provides a general view about the CEO in Malaysia and how the personality 
characteristic of CEOs in Malaysia influence the firm’s performance of Malaysian listed 
companies. The following part of chapter one introduces the background of study in regards 
of explaining further about narcissism of CEO and its impact to firm’s performance. 
Following that, problem statement is defined, while research questions and research 
objectives are stated. The chapter is ended with the scope of study and the organizational of 
study. 
 
1.2 Background of Study 
 
In recent years, Malaysia, as a developing country in Asia, has successfully transformed 
itself from an exporter of raw materials into a diversified-economy country. Services is the 
largest segment of the economy which accounts for around 54% of GDP. Manufacturing 
industry has been rising in recent years and currently constitutes 25% of GDP and more than 
60% of total exports. Mining and quarrying founds 9% of GDP which is the same as 
agriculture 9%. Malaysia is a middle-income country, and has converted itself from a 
 
 
manufacturer of raw materials since 1970s into an evolving multi-industry economy. 
Malaysia government has been continuously putting efforts to increase domestic demand in 
order to halt the economy from its reliance on exports. However, exports, particularly of 
electronics, still remain as a substantial driver of the economy. 
 
Yusoff (2005) states that Malaysia has gone through a rapid process of trade liberalization 
and globalization and the trade of import and export of USA, Japan and Singapore have 
greater impact towards the economic growth of Malaysia. Although household spending is 
probable to be influenced by the newly-implemented Goods and Services Tax (GST), and 
consequently leads to lower earnings in the commodity-related sectors, its influence will, 
however, to some extent being offset by government measures to help the targeted groups, 
the extra disposable incomes from lower oil prices and the encouraging workforce market 
situations. 
 
Furthermore, Malaysia is an open economy that export account about 118% of the gross 
domestic product. According to Datuk Seri Mustapha Mohamed, Malaysian country is a 
relatively small domestic market, so the international trade is the one that can support the 
economic growth of the country. As can see in the figure 1.1 below, during the year of 2009, 
Malaysia has undergone the lower growth rate, which is -7.6% because there was a global 
crisis in 2009 that affected the growth rate reduced around average -1.675. In year 2010, 
Malaysia GDP growth rate has recovered back to the normal rate and average of GDP annual 
growth rate is around 7.55%. In the year 2011, the average of GDP Malaysia is around 
5.625%. To increase more of the GDP growth rate, government will expand the Malaysian 
 
 




Source: Department of Statistics Malaysia (2015). 
Figure 1.1: Malaysia GDP Annual Growth Rate 
 
From 2000 to 2015, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Annual Growth Rate in Malaysia has 
reached an average of 4.77%, where the highest record attains a continuously high of 10.3% 
in the first quarter of 2010 and a lowest record of -6.20% in the first quarter of 2009. 
Malaysia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) expands 4.90% in the second quarter of 2015 
over the same quarter of the previous year. 
 
